Byzantine agreement is arguably one of the most fundamental problems in distributed computing. The basic idea of the problem is this: n players each vote on one of two choices, and the players want to hold an election to decide which choice wins. The problem is made more interesting by the fact that there is no leader, i.e. no single player who everyone knows is trustworthy and can be counted on to tabulate all the votes accurately.
and may behave in an arbitrary manner: for example, deviating from the protocol only at a critical moments, and in exactly the right way to cause the protocol to fail. In particular, in Byzantine agreement, we assume that the bad players are all controlled by a malicious adversary that knows the protocol run by the good players and can read all messages that are not specifically hidden from the bad players in some way.
Byzantine agreement (BA) is interesting for several reasons. First, the problem is broadly useful in the engineering sense of helping us build tools. If you can solve BA, you can solve the problem of how to build a system that is more robust than any of its components. For example, one can have each component vote on the outcome of a computation and then with BA its easy to determine which outcome is decided by a plurality of the components (e.g. first everyone sends out their votes, then everyone calculates the majority vote, then everyone solves BA to commit to a majority vote.) It is not surprising then that solutions to the BA problem have been used in all kinds of systems ranging from flight control, to data bases, to peer-to-peer; Microsoft uses BA in Farsite [4, 31] ; many structured peer-to-peer systems (e.g. Oceanstore [61, 52] ) use BA in some way or another. Any distributed system built with any pretension towards attack-resistance that is not using BA probably should be.
But that is just the engineering side of things. BA is useful because it allows us to study synchronization in complex systems. How can systems like birds, bees, bacteria, markets come to a decision robustly even when there is no leader. We know they do it, and that they do it robustly, but exactly how do they do it and what is the trade-off they pay between robustness and the time and communication costs of doing it? Studying upper and lower bounds on BA gives insight into these natural systems. The study of how these agreement building processes occur in nature has become quite popular lately, since they occur so pervasively.
BA is also useful because it helps us study fundamental properties of computation. The first major impossibility result on consensus (and hence BA) due to Fischer, Lynch and Patterson, in 1982, was that consensus is impossible for any deterministic algorithm with even one bad player (in the asynchronous communication model) [35] . However, a follow up paper by Ben-Or [12] showed that with a randomized algorithm, it was possible to solve BA even with a constant fraction of bad players, albeit in exponential time. This was a fundamental result in computer science giving some idea of how useful randomization can be for computation under an adversarial model.
In this article, we propose that 1) BA for modern large-scale networks is a fundamental and wellmotivated problem; and 2) designing a practical solution to BA for large-scale networks is a problem that recent results suggest may be solvable.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we make the case for developing a scalable algorithm for Byzantine agreement, where by scalable, we mean with latency and communication costs are at most polylogarithmic in the network size. To this end, we discuss several possible applications of scalable Byzantine agreement, including a relatively new connection with a game theoretic problem. In Section 3, we discuss what can and can not be accomplished in various models of Byzantine agreement. Next, in Section 4, we describe mathematical and algorithmic techniques that the authors have found useful in addressing the scalable Byzantine agreement problem. Finally, we conclude and describe areas for future work in Section 5.
A Case for Scalable BA
For many reasons, adversarial, or Byzantine, attacks are garnering increasing attention in the research community. For example, the following position paper, from 2008, makes a case for Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT): "BFT: The Time is Now" [23] . Unfortunately, system engineers have been less than enamored with the efficiency of current Byzantine agreement algorithms:
• "Unfortunately, Byzantine agreement requires a number of messages quadratic in the number of participants, so it is infeasible for use in synchronizing a large number of replicas" [61] • "Eventually batching cannot compensate for the quadratic number of messages [of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)]" [25] • "The communication overhead of Byzantine Agreement is inherently large" [20] There have been many attempts to circumvent this inefficiency by 1) trying to ensure Byzantine fault tolerance in a particular system without solving Byzantine agreement; and 2) trying to solve Byzantine agreement in special cases for a type of adversary that is unique to that paper. This approach is misguided. Why? To build secure systems, we need secure and trusted components. We should not create robust components from scratch for each new system.
So why the problem with Byzantine agreement? The problem is not the problem. Despite what naysayers say about Byzantine agreement being too paranoid, too hard, or too abstract, BA is the right problem formulation for building secure networks. To see this, consider the many systems papers (e.g. [1, 50, 19, 26, 21, 24, 22, 55] ) from the recent years that say that a key component of what they want to do requires BA. The problem is the solution. Or rather the lack of a solution. We still do not have a general algorithm to solve BA that is practical enough to plug in to the many systems that want to solve this problem. So despite all the work in this area, we contend that BA is still a major unsolved problem in distributed computing.
Applications
We now review applications of Byzantine agreement in potentially large-scale networks. Conspicuous by its absence from our discussion is the state machine approach for implementing fault-tolerant services (see e.g. [62] for a survey of this technique). This method relies critically on BA and is of interest to researchers and Internet companies alike [24, 50, 62] . However, in practice, the goal of this approach seem always to tolerate only a single adversarial fault and so typically networks consist of only 4 machines. In addition, there seems to be no evidence of a trend to increase network sizes for this approach in recent years. Thus, we focus on other applications, where there is a very clear trend of growing networks.
Our focus will be on two primary areas that can involve networks of large size: 1) peer-to-peer systems and ad hoc networks; and 2) game theoretic applications.
Peer-to-peer and Ad-hoc Networks
We now describe several applications and open problems related to scalable Byzantine agreement in the area of peer-to-peer and ad-hoc networks.
Distributed Hash Tables:
Byzantine agreement is a critical part of peer-to-peer systems such as Farsite [31] and Oceanstore [59] . These two systems are examples of peer-to-peer systems the provide the functionality of a distributed hash table(DHT [64] : essentially a DHT enables scalable, distributed storage and retrieval of data items. In general, peer-to-peer networks have no admission control, so it is to be expected that some nodes in the network will be adversarial in the sense that they will, e.g., attempt to prevent accurate storage and retrieval of content in the system. For example, it is well-known that spam attacks plague popular peer-to-peer file-sharing systems [67] . We ask: Can scalable Byzantine agreement algorithms provide for efficient DHTs that are robust to adversarial attack?
We note that there are techniques for tolerating Byzantine faults in distributed hash tables that do not rely on actually performing Byzantine agreement, see for example the work of Awerbuch and Scheideler on this topic [11] . However, we argue that there are several significant benefits to designing DHTs that derive their robustness from Byzantine agreement including the following: 1) BA provides a formal framework for analyzing distributed robustness: it taps into decades of rich theoretical and practical results, and is used in many application areas, thereby offering the possibility of serendipitous connection between problems in p2p networks and problems in databases, control systems, server farms, and so forth; 2) BA is flexible: it can enable not only robust access to data items, but also is a building block for problems of robust computation, which can be useful for voting, data mining, auctions, and so forth in a p2p setting; and 3) techniques in Awerbuch and Scheideler [11] require that the network start in a state where it consists of only good processors, BA allows for the possibility of removing this assumption. Finally, we note that there are gossipbased techniques for tolerating Byzantine faults that are applicable to non-DHT peer-to-peer networks [17, 54, 56] ; we believe there are fundamental connections yet to be found between these results also, and the problem of scalable Byzantine agreement.
Enforcing Rules: Many papers study the situation where we want to enforce fair sharing of peer-to-peer resources [57, 66] , or to enforce service contracts in grid computing [13, 36] . One simple approach to this problem is to rely on a small set of peers to track usage, and enforce quotas or contracts. In [57] , this set is called a "manager set" [57] , and as stated there: "To be robust against minority collusion, a remote node would insist that a majority of the manager nodes agree that a given request is authorized, requiring the manager set to perform a Byzantine agreement protocol". Unfortunately, as also mentioned in [57] , small manager sets are quite vulnerable to bribery attacks. Thus, to avoid bribery attacks, it is better to have a large manager set, and this large set may frequently need to perform scalable Byzantine agreement.
Wireless and Mobile Networks: Most current algorithms for solving BA generally assume that any two players in the system can communicate directly. Unfortunately, this assumption breaks down for ad hoc and mobile networks. Recent scientific results on quorum sensing in biological systems suggest that it is possible to solve BA in situ, provided that the underlying network is well-enough connected. The interesting question here is: Can we design scalable algorithms for solving BA in "well-connected" networks, for some reasonable definition of well-connected? An affirmative answer to this question would enable the following engineering applications in wireless networks: secure broadcast (see e.g. [14, 15, 16] ); integrity of data aggregation [63] ; and robust detection and removal of misbehaving nodes. We note that there are several algorithms for performing BA on networks that are not fully connected (see e.g. [27, 65, 30] ), however, these algorithms are not scalable. We note also that there are several algorithms that address the problem of Byzantine broadcast in wireless networks [16, 14, 15, 29, 44] . However, these algorithms do not perform Byzantine agreement, instead they enable correct dissemination of a message from one point in the network to the rest of the network.
Game Theory
We wrap up this section by describing in some detail a new, exciting connection between Byzantine agreement and problems in game theory.
Reduced Social Cost through Mediation
Game theory studies the emergent behavior in a group of agents, when each agent acts individually to maximize their own utility. A well-known phenomenon in most games is the "tragedy of the commons" effect. Informally, the tragedy of the commons occurs whenever selfish behavior by each player in the game leads to a situation that is disadvantageous to all the players. The focus of much game theoretic work in the computer science community is defining games that occur in computer networks; identifying those games that exhibit a significant tragedy of the commons effect; and suggesting ways to restructure games (via adding incentives or changing global policies) to reduce this effect (see, for example, [7, 9, 5, 6, 2, 68, 42, 37, 58] ). Unfortunately, many of these approaches encourage collaboration by changing the game itself, which may be undesirable or impracticable.
In 1999, in a highly influential paper, Papadimitriou and Koutsoupias [51] quantified the tragedy of the commons effect by defining the price of anarchy. The price of anarchy is the ratio between the social cost for the worst case Nash equilibrium and the social cost of the social optimum. 1 For example, consider the following "pollution game" for n players. Each player can decide to pollute or to not pollute. Each player incurs a cost of 2 if it does not pollute. Moreover, each player incurs an additional cost equal to total number of players that pollute. If n > 2, the only Nash equilibria for this game is for everyone to pollute and the social cost of this Nash equilibria is n 2 . On the other hand, in the social optimum, no player pollutes and the social cost is just 2n. Thus, the price of anarchy for this game is n/2.
One approach to reducing the price of anarchy of a game is to use a mediator. Intuitively, a mediator can be viewed as a trusted party that gives each player private advice on which action to pursue. The players retain free will and remain selfish, and will thus ignore the advice if it is in their best interest to do so.
To illustrate the ability of a mediator to reduce the social cost of a game, consider an infinite round pollution game, and a mediator which advises each player not to pollute until some player disregards this advice, after which the mediator will advise every player to pollute in every round. It is in the best selfish interest of each player to follow the advise of such a mediator, and when each player does follow this advice, the social cost per round is optimal. This simple mediator requires a game with multiple rounds in order to react to the actions that the players take. However, surprisingly, there are many single-round games for which mediators can reduce social cost, see for example, [40] . Mediators for such games rely critically on randomization.
Implementing a Mediator
In the mediator approach, one may imagine that the advice each player receives comes from an actual trusted external party. However, recent papers by Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, Halpern and Teague [2, 39] describe algorithms that implement a mediator in a distributed fashion, just by having the players talk amongst themselves (i.e. what economists refer to as "cheap talk"). In other words, they show that there exists a distributed algorithm for talking among the players that enables the simulation of a mediator. Moreover, in [2] it is shown that it is possible to achieve this in a robust manner [2] . More specifically, even if t players are adversarial and coalitions of up to k players may exist, it is possible to simulate a mediator provided that n > 3k + 3t. In later, work, Abraham, Dolev and Halpern [3] show that the bounds on t, k and n are essentially tight. Dispensing with the need for an actual trusted external party is frequently desirable since a trusted and impartial external party frequently may not exist.
Unfortunately, because these results rely on algorithms for secure multiparty computation, they are not scalable in that they require each player to send and receive at least O(n) bits. This limits the applicability of the results, for example, on games over large networks like the Internet. Byzantine agreement is a frequently used subroutine in protocols for secure multiparty computation, and hence it seems unlikely that scalability for secure multiparty computation can be achieved without a scalable solution to Byzantine agreement.
Followup work by Kol and Naor [49] improves on [2, 39] , and also makes the reliance on Byzantine agreement more explicit. In [49] , they describe distributed algorithms for implementing a mediator that do not rely on any cryptographic assumptions. They point out that some past results in [2, 39] make such assumptions and are thus susceptible to the problem of backwards induction. Essentially, backwards induction occurs when there is some round of a protocol, even a round exponentially far in the future, when the players would be able to decrypt secret information. If such a round of the protocol is ever reached, call it r, there is no longer any incentive for players to cooperate with each other during and after round r. Then, there is no incentive for the players to cooperate with each other in round r − 1 since in the next round there will be cooperation no matter what happens in round r. By backwards induction, the same argument holds for every round all the way back the first round of the protocol. Backwards induction is problematic when the game played involves fair sharing of information that is initially private and secret for each individual player, i.e. for a rational secret sharing game [39] . However, we note that backwards induction is not a problem for all types of mediators. For example, It is not problematic in the situation where the mediator uses global coin tosses, but the privacy of the global coin must be preserved for only up to a polynomial number of rounds (for an example of games for which this latter type of mediator can be useful, see for example [40] ).
The results of Kol and Naor, although non-cryptographic, do depend critically on the assumption of a broadcast channel. In particular, they explicitly assume a non-simultaneous broadcast channel (NSBC) where there is a single sender in each round. Unfortunately, it is non-trivial to implement such a channel in a game theoretic setting where only point-to-point communication exists between the players. Thus, it is a major open problem to remove this assumption from their result.
We contend that one of the major problems in this area is that of scalability. In particular, a scalable algorithm for implementing a mediator could lead to improved algorithms for a large number of problems in modern networks. To illustrate, we list below a few possible applications of a scalable approach to mediation.
• Virus Inoculation: Ensure that the nodes in a network inoculate against a virus in such a way that few nodes are infected, even when it costs each node to inoculate.
• Robust Network Creation: Create a network that is very likely to stay connected if up to a constant fraction of the nodes in the network are deleted, even when it costs each node to create a link.
• Contention Resolution: Allow a group of players to send over a single channel with little contention, even when it costs each player to wait for the channel.
While scalable Byzantine agreement is not a sufficient condition for scalable mediation, it does seem to be a necessary one. In addition, recent techniques for developing scalable Byzantine agreement algorithms may have some hope of carrying over to the more challenging problem of developing scalable protocols for secure multiparty computation and hence mediation. See Section 4 below for more discussion of these techniques.
What's Possible, What's Not
In this section, we will review different models of the Byzantine agreement problem and describe progress made towards a scalable solution to the problem. For all the models discussed, each processors is assumed to know the ID's of all processors in the network. Moreover, a processor is assumed to know the source of a message sent directly to it. An adversary is said to have full information if the adversary's actions, that is, the choice of bad processors and their actions and the scheduling of message delivery, can depend on the content of all messages sent, even those sent between good processors. The alternative is that the adversary knows the content only of messages sent to bad processors (private channels) or where the hardness of certain cryptographic primitives and a bound on the adversary's computational resources is assumed.
A nonadaptive adversary is one that chooses the set of bad processors at the start the protocol. In other words, it can not choose the set of bad processors based on the actual execution of the protocol (i.e., as determined by the random bits). In contrast, an adaptive adversary can take over processors at any time during the protocol, up to the point of taking over a set number of processors. The number of bad processors tolerated by an algorithm is refered to as the resilience of the algorithm.
Until recently, the need for all-to-all communication with a malicious adversary seemed almost axiomatic, and the most "practical" protocols in the message passing model required this. Let's look at this assumption more closely. We do know, from the 1985 result of Dolev and Reischuk, that any deterministic protocol in a synchronous model requires Ω(n 2 ) messages, and hence any randomized protocol will have some nonzero probability of error if it is limited to fewer messages. From the impossiblity result by Fischer, Lynch and Patterson [35] , any randomized protocol in the asynchronous model must have some non-terminating runs. And these statements are true even if there are private channels, cryptographic assumptions, and a nonadaptive adversary, since the adversary can be lucky and guess the processor's random bits at the start. Given this, one might still ask for an expected low cost of communication and 0 error. However, having an expected o(n 2 ) bits of communication with 0 probability of error is known to be impossible only in the asynchronous model with an adaptive adversary which has full information [8, 10] . There is still the possibility that it may be possible in other models though.
Unfortunately, there is no known protocol with o(n 2 ) expected bits of communication and 0 probability of error, in any of the models with Byzantine failures. Feldman and Micali in 1985 [33] began a line of work in the private channel model with an expected constant number of rounds; this was extended to the asynchronous model with optimal resilience. However, the protocols are rather complicated and involve significant communication overhead. A recent effort [60] reduces the expected number of bits communicated in the asychronous model with resilience less than n/4 toÕ(n 3 ) bits.
Finally, regarding resilience, it is impossible to have a randomized protocol with more than 1/3 fraction of bad processors according to an unpublished but often cited result of Karlin and Yao in 1984. All of the known protocols assume that a bad processor cannot spoof some arbitrary number of good processors as this would make any results impossible.
So what can be done with less than all-to-all communication? The authors and their collaborators have designed protocols that succeed with probability 1 − o(1) for various models which use o(n 2 ) bits and take polylogarithmic time, with resilience n(1/3 − ) for any positive constant . Most of these protocols involve an nonadaptive adversary. This makes it possible to choose and rely on a small representative subset of mostly good processors to coordinate efforts without a high risk that these particular processors will be corrupted.
In this scenerio, the authors and collaborators have shown that even if bad processors can send an unlimited number of bits and messages, it is possible to elect a small set of processors, that is representative in the sense that the fraction of bas processors in the set is not much more than the fraction of bad processors in the general population. Using this technique, it is possible to solve Byzantine agreement in the synchronous model using a polylogarithmic number of bits of communication per good processor and polylogarithmic time to bring all but a o(1) fraction of good processors to agreement with probability 1 − 1/n c , even if bad processors are allowed an unlimited number of bits of communication [47, 48] . It is also possible, with an average ofÕ( √ n) bits per processor and logarithmic time, to bring all processors to agreement [45] .
Most recently [43] , we have found that it is possible to do this in a load-balanced fashion, that is, where the number of bits sent by any one processor do not exceed the average number of bits per processor. In 2008, the authors and collaborators showed that similar techniques can be extended to give a polylogarithmic time BA protocol in the asynchronous model, though the probability of correctness falls to 1 − O(1/ log n). We are currently writing up a version of the algorithm that uses only a polyogarithmic number of bits per processor to elect a small representative set of processors and bring almost all processors to agreement. The result in [45] (but not the load balanced version) will then yield everywhere agreement in the asynchronous model using a total ofÕ( √ n) bits of communication. Relying on one small representative set of processors to act as the coordinators is not very robust if a malicious adversary can actively target this small group. To address this issue, the authors have recently found a scalable algorithm that uses secret sharing to circumvent the need to rely on small subsets of mostly good processors [46] . That is, it is possible to solve synchronous Byzantine agreement with an adaptive adversary and private channels usingÕ( √ n) bits per processor and logarithmic time. Moreover, it is possible to bring all but a o(n) fraction of good processors to agreement using only polylogarithmic number of bits of communication per processor.
We summarize the discussion above in Tables 1 and 2 . In these tables, E means to "in expectation", "No Agree" is the fraction of good processors which are not brought to agreement, "Error" is the probability of error, and LB means load balanced.
Adapt Full info Asynch No Agree Error Total Bits
Attiya [10] Yes Yes Yes 0 0 Ω(n 2 ) E FLP [35] No No Yes 0 > 0 Bounded Dolev [28] No [18] Yes Yes Yes 0 0Õ(n2 n )E YesÕ(2 n ) E Patra [60] Yes [47, 48] No 
The Techniques and Their Limits
In this section, we review some of the techniques from the authors' works.
Resisting Denial of Service Attacks
A difficult challenge when designing scalable BA algorithms is the threat of a denial of service attack by bad processors. That is, a good processor may send a request for information to another good processor, which receives similar requests from every bad processor, and thus cannot afford to respond to all such requests. This is sometimes dealt with in the literature by assuming away most of the problem: bad processors are limited to sending the same number of messages as good processors. 2 We believe this is an unreasonable assumption: during an attack, bad processors are likely to expend more resources than good processors. Alternatively, a fixed sparse overlay network (see Figure 1 ) for communication can be constructed so that messages from those without direct links to a processor are ignored. (It is assumed that a processor A receiving a message from a processor B can determine that the message is from B.) At the same time, a fixed network has certain disadvantages: bad processors can be chosen so as to surround good processors, cutting them off from any coordination efforts. By using averaging samplers (random-like bipartite graphs) in the design of the overlay network, this problem can be reduced but not avoided altogether.
Also, in such networks, the exact role of each processor is determined by its position in the sparse overlay network. What determines a processor's position? We presume the processors are numbered 1 to n. Alternatively the processors' IDs could have an implicit order, but this would require knowledge of all the IDs. Neither of these assumptions are realistic for the Internet. One might hope to use a hash function to map a larger universe of ID's down to n but this presumes global randomness at the start, or the inability of the adversary to pick the IDs. In any case, such protocols lack the simplicity given by the ID obliviousness of gossip protocols.
A bounded degree fixed overlay network at best achieves almost everywhere agreement for the reason described above. To go from almost everywhere to everywhere seems to require that almost any random pair of processors be able to communicate, yet this opens the door again to a denial of service attack, and appears to result in a √ n bottleneck resulting from the Birthday paradox. In particular, if every good processor sends out √ n requests and every good processor responds to each request with probability 1/ √ n, then on average one request from each good processor is serviced by a good processor, and no more than √ n messages are serviced no matter how many requests a good processor receives from bad processors. This technique presumes that the bombardment of a good processor with many requests does not prevent that processor from randomly choosing a small number to answer. The protocol in [46] requires even more of a good processor under attack: the good processor must compare values sent with each request to decide which to answer. Hence the amount of work done by each processor under a denial of service attack may be large, though the number of messages sent by good processors is relatively small.
Amplifying Randomness
Another key idea in the work of the authors is the use of a short string with a constant fraction of random bits, where the remaining bits are set by an adversary which can see the random bits. In the full information nonadaptive adversary model, the authors' protocols elect a small set of representative processors which generate an agreed upon logarithmic length string with mostly random bits. Alternatively, in the case of an adaptive adversary and private channels [46] , simply the string, without the set of processors, is generated. Such strings can be generated with high probability, and they prove to be very powerful. Generating a single random bit with high probability seems like a much harder problem, especially in the full information model, perhaps no easier that the problem of electing a single good leader (See [32] ) .
As in work on pseudorandomness (see [38] ), this string known as a bit fixing random source can be used as input to an averaging sampler, to amplify randomness. See Figure 2 . For example, a string whose individual bits are generated by each member of a subset containing a small constant fraction of good processors can be used to select a comparably sized subset with almost a 2/3 fraction of good processors from a set containing a 2/3 fraction of good processors.
This amplification is needed especially for the asynchronous scenerio where action must be taken despite the fact that bits from good processors are arbitrarily delayed [41] . A single short string with some random bits is sufficient for other interesting purposes, such as providing global coins for Rabin's BA algorithm (as used in [46] ), agreeing upon a collection of many small representative sets (quorums) [43] , and, in general, choosing from a distribution where a large fraction of choices are good.
Running Elections
Constructing a small set of representatives (or small string with some random bits) is a gradual elimination process based on Feige's bin selection algorithm [32] . Small groups of processors, most of which contain at least a 2/3 fraction of good processors, each elect a subset of processors (or random bits) to proceed in a tournament-like protocol, so that eventually only a small group of processors (or random bits) survive. See Figure 3 .
Feige's bin selection algorithm, originally developed for the broadcast model, is so simple and clever that it is worth mentioning here. See Figure 4 .
Each processor announces to the others its choice of a bin number from a certain range. The processors that pick the bin chosen by the fewest processors are elected. Even if the adversary waits to hear the good processors' choices, it cannot bias very much the make-up of the committee. Such an approach may be extendable to a game theory scenerio where there are more than just the two factions of good and bad.
Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that Byzantine agreement remains a fundamental and well-motivated problem in distributed computing, and that, moreover, scalable BA is an important problem because of the increasing size of modern networks. We have discussed several recent applications of Byzantine agreement, including a new connection with game theory; have discussed upper and lower bounds on the problem in various models; and have discussed new techniques for designing scalable algorithms for BA. There are many important open problems that remain including the following.
• Is the √ n communication cost for doing Byzantine agreement somehow fundamental? More precisely, can we do Byzantine agreement with o(n 3/2 ) total bits communication with high probability?
Perhaps an easier problem is: Can we do Byzantine agreement with each processor sending o( √ n) bits if we limit the number of messages the adversary sends and the channels are public? Note: it is easy to achieve as little as O(n log n) total bits communication with a communication limited adversary and public channels, the challenging problem is achieving this in a load-balanced sense.
• There are several obvious gaps in Tables 1 and 2 , that need to be closed. As just one example, can we do asynchronous BA with an adaptive adversary and private channels, where each processor sends o(n 2 ) bits?
• Can we make any of the scalable almost-everywhere algorithms for BA into Las Vegas algorithms?
• Can we use techniques for scalable Byzantine agreement to design a scalable algorithm for simulating a mediator? A first approach to this is designing an algorithm for scalable BA in the case where all players are selfish.
• Can we use techniques from the scalable BA algorithms to address problems of robustness in networks subject to churn? An idea is to assume that: 1) the number of processors fluctuates between n and √ n where n is the size of name space; 2) the processors do not know explicitly who is in the system at any time; and 3) that the number of bad processors in the system is always less than a 1/3 fraction. In such a model, can we 1) do Byzantine agreement; and 2) maintain small (i.e. polylogorathimic size) quorums of mostly good processors?
